Washington Law Review
Volume 51
Number 3 Symposium: Law and the
Correctional Process in Washington
7-1-1976

Mental Commitment and the Principle of Equivalence
Stephen E. Oliver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen E. Oliver, Comment, Mental Commitment and the Principle of Equivalence, 51 Wash. L. Rev. 733
(1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol51/iss3/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

MENTAL COMMITMENT AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE
The state's correctional process can impinge upon an individual's
liberty in several ways. In Washington, for example, a person can be
involuntarily deprived of his liberty after a finding of criminal culpability,' delinquency or dependency, 2 mental disorder, 3 chronic alcoholism, 4 sexual psychopathy,5 or after a determination of incompetence to stand trial or an acquittal on grounds of insanity. 6 This comment focuses upon those procedures which can result in commitment
to mental institutions. Because of the large number of persons deprived of their liberty through civil and criminal commitment to
mental institutions, 7 it is important to critically evaluate the substantive and procedural judicial safeguards provided to those committed
individuals. These safeguards are necessary to insure that such individuals are not being deprived, without due process of law, of their
constitutional right to freedom.
Although the United States Constitution requires that no person be
deprived of liberty without due process of law,8 courts have often applied different standards 'of due process to analogous deprivation-ofliberty situations. But these situations, whether criminal trials, crim1. See WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9 (1974); id. tit. 9A (Supp. 1975).
2. See id. tit. 13 (1974).
3. See id. ch. 71.05. For an extensive review of Washington's law of civil commitment see Comment, Progress in Involuntary Commitment, 49 WASH. L. REV. 617
(1974).

4.

See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.96A (1974). For an overview of this statute see

Note, Decriminalizationof Alcoholism--Alcoholism as a Defense to Criminal Liability, 50 WASH. L. REV. 755 (1975).

5.

See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1974).

6.

See id.ch. 10.77.

7. In 1972, 169,032 persons were involuntarily committed to state and county
mental hospitals. Additionally, 9,261 persons were committed to mental institutions
after being found incompetent to stand trial. Note, Developments in the Law--Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193 n.3 (1974) [herein-

after cited as Developments]. This number almost equals the 197,838 persons incarcerated in state and federal prisons at the end of 1971. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 164
(95th ed. 1974).
The traditional substantive due process bases for this large scale confinement of
the mentally ill are the doctrines of parens patriae and the police power. It has been
recently suggested that neither parens patriae nor the police power can properly be

employed as a doctrinal basis for mental commitment. See Article, Substantive Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 128 (1974).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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inal commitment proceedings, or civil commitment proceedings, are
more similar than they are different. They have the same goals of societal protection and individual rehabilitation and follow similar procedures, involving both an adjudicatory phase (trial or hearing) and a
dispositive phase (sentencing or commitment). Furthermore, whether
the procedure is labelled a trial or a commitment proceeding, the sanction--deprivation of liberty-is the same. This comment advances the
argument-herein referred to as the principle of equivalence-that
because these trial and commitment proceedings are analytically more
similar than different, the same standards of due process should be
applied to each. 9
I.

DUE PROCESS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS-THE SEARCH FOR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Traditionally, states have taken a restrictive view of patients' rights

9. Courts have generally failed to recognize this principle and have therefore
failed to apply the same standards of due process to all deprivations of liberty. Commentators have generally agreed with the reasoning of the majority of the courts.
See, e.g., Leavy. The Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 197. 200
(1973).
Some courts, however, have begun impliedly to recognize a limited version of the
principle of equivalence. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967), the United States Supreme Court noted that juvenile proceedings are essentially the same as adult criminal proceedings in terms of the basic nature of the proceedings and of the available
sanctions. The Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment require that the protections afforded a defendant in a juvenile proceeding be substantially the same as those afforded in a criminal trial.
The principle of equivalence has not been applied as broadly in the area of mental
commitment. But the Supreme Court has recognized that equal protection requires
that one facing commitment to a mental institution through the criminal system be
afforded the same rights as those provided to one facing civil commitment. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The Court. however, has not yet addressed
the federal procedural due process question in civil commitment proceedings.
Nevertheless, the deprivation of liberty occasioned by mental commitment may be
equal to if not greater than that suffered during prison incarceration:
[B]y its very nature, confinement at an institution for the criminally insane is
far more restrictive than at a prison. Nothing more dramatically illustrates this
difference than the petty indignities to which inmates in the former are subjected.
• . * Accordingly, we would delude ourselves if we believed that a prisoner's
transfer to a prison maintained for the criminally insane is a mere administrative matter. Prison and asylum are divided by far more than the few miles that
separate Clinton and Dannemora.
Shuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1080 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847
(1969).
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at involuntary commitment proceedings, 10 for unless the legislature
had provided otherwise, the requirements of procedural due process
were deemed to have been met so long as notice and an opportunity to
be heard were provided." This apparent lack of concern for individual rights generally has been based on the notion that the state, as
parenspatriae,is acting for the good of the potential patient.
The only case in which the United States Supreme Court has dealt
directly with the procedural due process rights of those subject to civil
commitment proceedings was the 1901 case of Simon v. Craft.12 In
Simon, the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required that one subjected to an involuntary lunacy
hearing be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend. More recently, the lower federal courts have frequently considered the due process rights of those subject to civil commitment. In
1968 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Heryford v.
Parker 3 that due process rights applicable to involuntary civil com10. For example, in In re Leary, 272 Minn. 34, 136 N.W.2d 552 (1965), the
court stated:
[T] he sole object of a proceeding of this kind is to ascertain as best we can
whether the person involved is so mentally ill as to need hospital care. If that
fact is established, the decision should stand unless the patient has been deprived of a right to be adequately heard.
136 N.W.2d at 560. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 34-35 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
For a comprehensive overview of the statutory mental commitment provisions of
the 50 states and the District of Columbia see AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 93-282 (B. Ennis & L. Siegel eds.
1973). See also Developments, supra note 7, at 1203-05 nn.1 1-17.
11. See, e.g., Culbertson v. County of Santa Clara, 261 Cal. App. 2d 274, 67
Cal. Rptr. 752 (1968); State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969).
12. 182 U.S. 427 (1901). The Court denied relief to Mrs. Simon, who was held
by the sheriff and did not appear at the proceedings, on the basis that the record was
devoid of any indication that she was at any time refused an opportunity to defend.
The Court also pointed out that a guardian ad litem had been appointed to represent
her interests in the proceedings and had denied all allegations of the petition.
The opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), a recent Supreme
Court case with wide ranging implications with respect to the substantive due process
rights of the mentally committed, did not address the issue of the committed person's
procedural rights. Justice Stewart specifically foreclosed consideration of procedural
questions: "We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally
ill person may be confined by the State on any of the [traditional] grounds ..... Id.
at 573-74. For an examination of this case and its implications see Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-CivilCommitment, 51 WASH. L. REV. 764 (1976).
13. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). In a clear showing of the importance of
counsel the Supreme Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), that
the right to counsel attaches even in misdemeanor prosecutions where the exposure
to potential incarceration is quite limited. Justice Douglas concluded: "Absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
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mitment included the right to counsel at commitment hearings. In
Dixon v. Attorney General1 4 the Federal District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, relying principally upon the United States
Supreme Court cases of Specht v. Pattersont 5 and In re Gault,1 6 held
that the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act was unconstitutional on its
face. Having found the statute to be "almost completely devoid of the
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment," the court
created a comprehensive set of principles to guide the state in future

involuntary commitments.

17

The principles set forth are in most re-

spects the same as those procedural protections which govern criminal
trials. Thus Dixon represents a systematic effort to deal with the problems of due process in commitment proceedings with a recognition
that the situation is not unlike a criminal trial.

In Lessard v. Schmidt,1 8 a three-judge court sitting in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin set forth a scheme of procedural standards to
govern civil commitment even more comprehensive than those mancounsel at his trial." Id. at 37. If being involuntarily placed in a mental institution
constitutes an equal, if not greater, loss of liberty than does imprisonment, it would
seem clear that the Heryford decision represents a correct interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
14. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
15. 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (violation of due process not to afford separate hearing
and right of confrontation when convicted sex offender is sentenced to indeterminate
term under sex offender statute applicable if judge's opinion is that offender is dangerous to public or a habitual offender and mentally ill).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process requirements apply to juvenile court proceedings).
17. 325 F. Supp. at 973-75. Specifically, the state must provide: (1) counsel; (2)
a psychiatrist when necessary to assist an indigent in preparing his defense; (3) that
all communication between such a psychiatrist and the defendant be privileged: (4)
a verbatim transcript and full record of the proceedings; (5) the right to state appellate review, including the provision of counsel and record and transcript without cost
to the indigent.
The burden of proof and standard for commitment required in Dixon were stated
succinctly:
[T] he fact finder must establish clearly, unequivocally and convincingly that the
subject of the hearing requires commitment because of manifest indications that
the subject poses a present threat of serious physical harm to other persons or to
himself. No commitment shall authorize confinement at Fairview State Hospital
absent a specific finding based on a preponderance of the evidence that placement at Fairview State Hospital is necessary. To support such a finding the Commonwealth shall have the burden of proving that there is no facility or part of a
facility where the subject can be committed.
Id. at 974.
This far-reaching opinion seems to fall short of the ideal only in not providing for a
jury trial and in not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974). on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974). vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
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dated by Dixon. In holding the Wisconsin civil commitment procedures violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the court prescribed certain procedural requirements to be followed in
a mental commitment proceeding. The procedural requirements mandated by Lessard include the following: right to notice which fully
apprises the individual of the allegations in support of commitment,
right to a hearing which affords a realistic opportunity to contest the
commitment, right to counsel, right to a jury trial, right to demand
that allegations be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, right to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to exclude
hearsay evidence from the hearing.
It is evident that the courts are beginning to recognize that in the
sense of what the defendant or detainee stands to lose, the differences
between criminal, juvenile, criminal commitment and civil commitment proceedings are inconsequential because in each case the right to
remain at liberty is at stake. Courts are recognizing- that procedural
safeguards are constitutionally required not only for criminal defendants but for others faced with the possibility of forfeiting the same
degree of liberty. 19 Additionally, implicit in the holdings of Heryford,
Lessard, and Dixon is the principle that procedural due process protections should be based on the probability that, under the procedure
in question, the substantive law will be abused.
Consistent with the trend exemplified by Heryford, Dixon, and Lessard, the Washington legislature in 1973 overhauled the state's civil
commitment statute 20 and provided extensive procedural safeguards
for persons drawn into the system. The statute accords the detained
person the safeguards of notice and hearing. 2 1 It also specifically pro-

19. It may be too soon to exp~ect full acceptance of the principle of equivalence. Years may pass before the Supreme Court requires a comprehensive set of

substantive and procedural constitutional safeguards, such as that set forth in Lessard,
in civil commitments. Federal courts which have dealt with the issue of detention
prior to an insanity hearing have generally ignored the principle of equivalence and

have held that such detention is constitutionally valid if the incarcerated individual
is given adequate notice of the availability of habeas corpus and if a due process
hearing is held as promptly as is feasible. See In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.

1971) (initial hearing must be held within the first 48 hours of confinement); Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970); Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F.
Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
20. The new act is codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.010-.930 (1974). The
mechanics of the act are discussed in Comment, Progress in Involuntary Commit,nent,49 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1974).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.200 (1974). See also id. §§ 71.05.240, .310.
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vides for the right to counsel 22 and the right to a jury trial. 23 Furthermore, the statute places the burden of proof upon the state to establish
its allegations "by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,"2 4 a standard of proof which the Washington Supreme Court has termed the
civil equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 Finally, the
statutory provisions protect the detained person's privilege against selfincrimination 26 and provide for periodic judicial review of each person's commitment. 27 No single order of commitment can exceed 180
days in length. 28 In short, due process rights are well-protected under
Washington's civil commitment procedures.
The fact that Washington and other states2 9 have recently incorporated due process safeguards into their civil commitment statutes,
however, does not alleviate the need for the promulgation of clear-cut
constitutional standards by the United States Supreme Court. As long
as the Court continues to avoid the issue of procedural due process in

22. Id. § 71.05.460. The right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings was
also mandated by the Washington court in In re Quesnell. 83 Wn. 2d 224, 517 P.2d
568(1973).
23. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.300, .310 (1974).
24. Id. § 71.05.3 10.
25. In re Levias. 83 Wn. 2d 253. 256. 517 P.2d 588, 590 (1973). Numerous
other courts have adopted a standard of proof higher than a mere preponderance of
the evidence in cases concerning civil commitment. See, e.g., In re Ballay. 482 F.2d
648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); People v. Burnick. 14 Cal. 3d 306.
535 P.2d 352. 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); In re Hodges. 325 A.2d 605 (D.C. App.
1974); In re Pickles' Petition, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); People v. Sansone, 18 II1. App. 3d 315. 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); Devton v. Commonwealth. 383
S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.250(4) (1974).
27. Id. § 71.05.320.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-520 et seq. (1974) (enacted 1974);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-501 et seq. (1971) (enacted 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2 §§
1-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1976) (enacted 1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 §§ I
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975) (enacted 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433A.200 et seq.
(1975) (enacted 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B:1 et seq. (Supp. 1975)
(enacted 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975) (enacted
1974); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.010 et seq. (1974) (enacted 1973).
The policy declaration found in the North Carolina civil commitment act exemplifies the values embodied in these new enactments:
It is the policy of the State that no person shall be committed to a mental
health facility unless he is mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous
to himself or others; that a commitment will be accomplished under conditions
that protect the dignity and constitutional rights of the person; and that committed persons will be discharged as soon as a less restrictive mode of treatment
is appropriate.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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the area of mental commitment, 3 0 the substantial risk of the use of
unfair procedures continues to exist in those states lacking a statutory
framework such as Washington's. 31 This problem becomes acute
when the principle of equivalence is invoked to bring the due process
principles of civil commitment to bear upon the criminal commitment
procedures discussed in Part I1.32
II.

DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS

Despite current expansion of statutory due process safeguards in
the field of civil commitment, expansion of procedural due process
protections in criminal commitment proceedings 33 continues to be
slow. The disparity between procedures in civil and criminal commitments is inconsistent with the principle of equivalence advanced in
this comment. Some of the barriers to equivalent treatment are beginning to fall, however.
A threshold barrier to the development of a comprehensive set of
due process rights in the field of criminal commitment was eliminated
in 1967 in Specht v. Patterson34 wherein the United States Supreme
Court rejected the notion that the decision to commit a convicted individual to a mental institution as a sexual psychopath involves simply a
sentencing decision wholly within the disposition phase of a proceeding. 35 In Specht, the Court held that a person could not be ad30. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
31. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45 §§ 205 et seq. (Cum. Supp. "1973); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-401 et seq. (1971); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 334-51 et seq. (1968); KAN.

STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-61
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-322 et seq. (1971); NJ. STAT.
§§ 30:4-23 et seq. (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.01 et seq.
(Page 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-63 et seq. (1975).
32. An examination of the law of due process in criminal commitment proANN.

ceedings will demonstrate that courts generally are willing to require substantial
equivalence between civil and criminal commitment procedures. But if a given state's
civil commitment system lacks procedural safeguards, then the principle of equivalence cannot work to upgrade the procedural inadequacies frequently associated with
criminal commitment.
33. This comment discusses three types of criminal commitment proceedings:
(1) commitment of an accused prior to conviction on grounds of incompetence to
stand trial; (2) commitment to a mental institution after acquittal on grounds of
insanity; and (3) commitment after a finding of sexual psychopathy or psychopathic

delinquency.
34.

386 U.S. 605 (1967).

35. It is clear that any criminal commitment proceeding involves an adjudicatory
phase (determination of the existence of a mental condition in a criminal defendant
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judged "an habitual offender" under Colorado's Sex Offenders Act

absent adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and by so doing
foreclosed the argument that the decision to commit is simply a sen36
tencing option.
The possibility of commitment can arise at a number of points in
the criminal justice process from arrest to imprisonment. 37 Varying
substantive tests and procedural protections have been developed by
the courts to be applied at each of these points. An analysis of each
point will demonstrate, however, that despite the apparent complexity
of existing case law in this field, there are no significant barriers to the
recognition of the fundamental equivalence of the various proceedings
and the application of consistent due process protections to each of

them.
A.

Incompetence to Stand Trial

Since the mid-17th century the common law rule has been that one
can not be required to plead to an indictment or stand trial when so
38
disordered as to be incapable of putting forth a "rational" defense.
In the federal courts, in order to be competent, the defendant must
which warrants his commitment rather than incarceration) and a disposition phase
(specification of the nature and duration of the defendant-patient's confinement within
the mental health system). On the other hand, a criminal defendant facing a postconviction sentencing hearing has passed the adjudicatory phase as guilt has already
been determined. The United States Supreme Court recognizes the fact that a convicted defendant facing sentencing can be afforded less in the way of due process
than an unconvicted defendant. In Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). the
Court held that the sentencing decision was one to be left to the discretion of the
trial judge and that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require the judge either to hold a hearing or to allow the defendant to make a statement before imposing sentence. See also Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
Whether the limited scope of due process granted one facing sentencing is constitutionally valid or desirable, or both, is not a question to be dealt with here. It need
only be observed that sentencing is clearly distinguishable from criminal commitment in that the former is solely concerned with the disposition phase of the process
of depriving one of liberty. Thus an expansion of the rights afforded one facing
criminal commitment does not require, as a doctrinal question. a concomitant increase in due process for sentencing hearings. For a discussion of due process in the
sentencing hearing see Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to
Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 25 (1970) and Cohen. Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay. 47 TEXAS L. REv.
1 (1968).
36. 386U.S.at6lO.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. Comment, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CRINi. L.C.
& P.S. 569. 570 (1968). See generally Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 455 (1967).
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possess sufficient present ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and must demonstrate a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against
him or her. This rule was announced in the case of Dusky v. United
States,39 involving the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
competency statute. 40 Whether the aforementioned test also represents
a substantive constitutional test of competency is not clear. The Dusky
case has been cited with approval in other Supreme Court decisions
dealing with competency. 41 Generally, state rules regarding compe42
tency are consistent with the Dusky test.
According to Washington statutory law, a person incompetent to
stand trial is one who "lacks the capacity to understand the nature of
the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense as a result
of mental disease or defect." 43 Consistent with the prevailing view, the
Washington Supreme Court has held that a person incompetent to
44
stand trial may not be prosecuted.
39. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970) provides in part:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the
expiration of any period of probation the United States Attorney has reasonable
cause to believe that a person charged with an offense against the United States
may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense,
he shall file a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of
the accused ....
41. For example, in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), a case dealing with
the right to a hearing on the question of competency in a state court, the Dusky
case is not cited with regard to the proper substantive test of competency but rather
for its discussion of the problems involved in a retrospective determination of competency. Id. at 387. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Pate, states that "the test . . . is
reasonably well settled," citing Dusky. Id. at 388. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 170
(1975), the Court made it clear that it is a violation of due process to require a person to stand trial while incompetent, but again the Court declined to spell out the
exact meaning of "incompetent."
42. See Note, supra note 38, at 457. The test of competency to stand trial differs
from the standard for a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. This distinction was
pointed out by the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Harris, 431 Pa. 114,
243 A.2d 408, 409 (1968), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney,
424 Pa. 493, 227 A.2d 159, 160 (1967):
'The test to be applied in determining the legal sufficiency of his mental capacity
to stand trial, or enter a plea at the time involved, is not the M'Naghten 'right
or wrong' test, but rather his ability to comprehend his position as one accused
of [crime] and to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense."
See also State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 244 A.2d 258, 265 (1968).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(6) (1974). Prior to the enactment of id. ch.
10.77 in 1974, the test of competency was whether a person possessed the capacity
to understand his peril and to rationally assist his counsel. See, e.g., State v. Mahaffey, 3 Wn. App. 988, 478 P.2d 787 (1970).
44. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 74 Wn. 2d 261, 444 P.2d 150 (1968); State ex rel.
Mackintosh v. Superior Court, 45 Wash. 248, 88 P. 207 (1907).
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The competency rule developed out of the need to preserve the legitimacy and dignity of the criminal process and in order to facilitate
the defendant's awareness of the basis for his punishment, 45 but in
operation this has facilitated the permanent incarceration of people
accused of even the most petty offenses. 4 6 The standards for invoking
the competency rule and the nature and duration of the confinement
that can be imposed on the basis of it, however, have undergone tremendous change in recent Supreme Court decisions.
1.

Right to hearing

In Pate v. Robinson47 the Court held that a criminal defendant is
entitled to a hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial. The
Court stated that a trial judge is required sua sponte to convene a
hearing on the question of sanity at any time during proceedings when
the evidence before the court raises a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competence. 4 8 Although Pate clearly established the right to
a competency hearing 49 and requires that the judge, under appropriate circumstances, raise the issue himself to avoid reversible error,
the point at which the right to a hearing arises is not clear. The bona
fide doubt test was drawn by the Court from the Illinois statute involved in the case. 50 Whether the Court was merely citing the applicable state standard with approval or elevating it to a constitutional
requirement is a question left unresolved by the Court's opinion. The
federal courts, however, have employed the bona fide doubt test with

45. See Note, supra note 38. at 457-59.
46. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). where the accused, who
was charged with theft of property valued at less than ten dollars. was originally
committed, without trial, to what amounted to a life sentence because of the likelihood
that he would never be competent to stand trial. The Supreme Court held that, in
the absence of a prior hearing, such indeterminate commitments were unconstitutional. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text infra.
47. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
48. Id. at 385.
49. In Washington. the hearing requirement is contained in WASH. REV. CODE §
10.77.090 (1974).
50. § 104-2 [1963] Illinois Laws 2836 (repealed 1973) (now codified as ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-2-I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976)) provided in part:
(b) If during the trial the court has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent the court shall suspend the proceedings and shall conduct a hearing
to determine the defendant's competency and shall at the election of the defendant impanel ajury to determine that issue.
See also People v. Shrake. 25 Ill.2d 141, 182 N.E.2d 754 (1962).
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considerable regularity since Pate v. Robinson was decided. 5 1 Washington State has incorporated the bona fide doubt test in its statutory
framework. 52 Once the right to a hearing has been established the
question arises as to the type of hearing required, i.e., whether the
accused is entitled to the benefits of counsel, jury trial, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
2.

Right to counsel

The Federal Constitution requires that an attorney be provided in
any proceeding "where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial."' 53 Washington law is consistent with this
constitutional mandate, guaranteeing an accused person the right to
counsel, appointed if necessary, at all stages of a competency proceeding. 5 4 The Washington competency statute also provides defendants the right to have counsel present during any court-ordered psychiatric examinations. 55 Federal court decisions have indicated that
court-appointed experts are constitutionally mandated in situations
where refusal to provide expert aid would deny the defendant adequate opportunity to make a defense. 56 The Washington statute guarantees indigents the right to retain psychiatric experts to perform
57
examinations and to testify in behalf of the accused.

51.

E.g., Tyler v. Beto, 391 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1968); Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d

663 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 19.66).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060 (1974) provides in part:
Whenever a defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, or there is
reason to doubt his competency, the court on its own motion or on the motion of
any party shall ... appoint ... at least two qualified experts ... to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the defendant.
53. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020 (1974).

55.

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(4). Some courts have denied the existence of

a right to have counsel present at such examinations, apparently upon the grounds

that to do so would substantially disrupt the physician-patient relationship and effectively preclude any determination of competency. See, e.g., United States v. Albright,

388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465,
122 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1975). But see Thornton v. Corcoran. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (Bazelon, CJ.).
56. See, e.g., Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), affd per curiam, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1965). See also Lincoln v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 21 Md. App. 501, 320 A.2d 552

(1974).
57.

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(2) (1974).
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Burden of proof
The question of the burden of proof as to competency in mental

commitment proceedings is significant. Because the Supreme Court
has never dealt directly with the question of the burden of proof, no
federal due process standard exists. State standards vary depending
upon the jurisdiction. Tradition and reason, however, have resulted in
a presumption of competence,5 8 which is analogous to the presumption of innocence. Thus the issue becomes one of the burden to be
borne in establishing incompetence. A persuasive argument can be
made for the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
in all areas of commitment. 59 Under the Washington statute, incompe60
tence must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
4.

Right tojury and privilege againstself-incrimination

It is unclear whether Pate v. Robinson requires a jury trial on the
issue of competency to stand trial. At least one state court has concluded that it does not. 6 1 Washington provides for a jury in compe62
tency hearings.
58.
See generally W. LAFAVE AND A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 298 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAl LAW 852 (1969); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03. Comment (Tent. Draft

No. 4. 1955).
59. This is particularly true when the state is the party asserting the defendant's
incompetence. When a defendant is charged with a minor violation, he often is
quite anxious to avoid a finding of incompetency because of the hardships that
accompany such a finding. e.g., long periods of confinement in a mental institution
even though the underlying offense carries only a small fine or jail sentence. See Janis.
Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural Safeguards and a Proposed
Statutory Scheme, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 720 (1974). Consequently. by asserting and
establishing a defendant's incompetence, the state is imposing a potentially greater
burden than that imposed by a criminal conviction. Since the impositions upon the
defendant are of an equal magnitude, the state should be required to meet the beyond
a reasonable doubt'standard in both situations.
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(2) (1974). See also Young v. Smith. 8 Wn.
App. 276. 505 P.2d 824 (1973) (no requirement that the reasonable doubt test be
applied to the determination of competency). Under Washington law, it is unclear
what party has the burden of proving incompetence. Presumably the burden is upon
the party asserting lack of competence. This is by no means a universal rule.
Louisiana. for example, places the burden on the accused to show competence by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Flores. 315 So. 2d 772 (La. 1975).
61. Commonwealth v. Bruno. 435 Pa. 200. 255 A.2d 519 (1969); accord, U.S.
v. Davis. 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966). But see People v. Metesky. 71 Misc. 2d
519. 336 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1972) (an indicted but untried felony defendant detained
as incompetent is entitled to a review of detention, which review includes the right
to ajury trial).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.090(2) (1974). But cf. State v. Walker. 13 Wn.
App. 545, 536 P.2d 657 (1975) (the constitutional right to trial by jury is not denied
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The case law is divided on the issue of whether one has the privilege against self-incrimination during hearings and psychiatric examinations concerning one's competency to stand trial. 63 A Washington
statute protects an accused's privilege against self-incrimination
during competency proceedings. 64 The statute also provides that a
defendant need not answer questions during a psychiatric examination
65
if he believes that doing so may tend to incriminate him.
5.

Nature and durationof confinement

The nature and duration of commitment on the basis of incompetency to stand trial has been considered extensively by the courts.
Until recently, prolonged commitments based upon incompetence to
stand trial were common. 6 6 Allegations that such confinement denied
the defendant his constitutional right to a speedy trial have been consistently rejected.67 The interest of the state in the "safekeeping" of an
incompetent defendant was deemed sufficient to justify prolonged in68
carceration.
by placing upon the court the decision whether the defendant is competent to
participate in a trial).
63. This issue was clearly presented in McNeil v. Director, Patixent Inst., 407
U.S. 245 (1972), where the petitioner, McNeil, had been confined in a mental institution for a period beyond his original penal sentence because of his refusal to answer questions put to him by the staff psychiatrists. Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall disposed of the case on general due process grounds without reaching the
fifth amendment question. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, concluded that
McNeil's refusal to answer the psychiatrist's questions was protected by the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 257.
The California Court of Appeals recently concluded that the privilege against
self-incrimination is not violated by compelling a defendant to submit to examination by court-appointed psychiatrists. Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d
465, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1975). Contra, Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). For a general discussion of this problem see Fielding, Compulsory PsychiatricExamination in Civil Committment and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 117, 138 (1973).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(4) (1974).
65. Id.
66. See generally Janis, supra note 59 at 722.
67. See U.S. v. Pate, 351 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 962
(1966); U.S. v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959). See also Schwader v.
District Court, 172 Colo. 474, 474 P.2d 607 (1970). But see United States v. Geelan,
520 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding a speedy trial challenge).
68. See, e.g., Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1971). In Daniels, the
state's interest in the safekeeping of the patient-plaintiff indicted for rape but found
incompetent provided a valid basis for not releasing him when sanity and competency were regained even though he would have been entitled to release if he had
been found not guilty by reason of insanity and later regained sanity.
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This justification was eliminated by the Supreme Court's decision
70
in Jackson v. Indiana.6 9 In that landmark decision, the Court held:
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the
case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
other citizen, or release the defendant.
The decision was based on the proposition that to do otherwise violates both the equal protection and due process clauses. 7 ' The Court
recognized from the facts that Jackson could never regain his sanity
and that, in effect, he had been given a life sentence in a manner totally devoid of the requisite due process. "At the least, due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.'72

The Court pointed out that the basis for incompetency commitment
is to allow the state to engage in efforts to make the defendant ready
for trial. The Court indicated that confinement for this purpose must
be temporary and implied that this requires that the defendant receive
treatment: "[H] is continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal [attaining competency] . ' 73 An adversary
hearing to litigate the issues relevant 74 to the type of commitment contemplated must be held.
The effect of Jackson is to limit the duration and nature of commitments based upon incompetency. Commitment on this ground can
only be for the period of time necessary to establish whether the de69. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
70. Id. at 738.
71. The basis for the equal protection argument was found in the Court's prior
decision of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (standards applied to the
commitment of a person nearing the end of a penal sentence could not differ from
those ordinarily utilized in civil commitment proceedings) and the denial of certiorari in Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847
(1969).
72. 406 U.S. at 738.
73. Id.
74. Relevant issues might include: the petitioner's ability to function in society.
the state's interest in his restraint and the state's ability to aid him through treatment.
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fendant's incompetency is correctable. If it is not, the defendant must
be released or committed via the civil system; if it is, further commitment may be justified, but only so long as treatment can be shown to
be achieving demonstrable progress toward the goal of restoring competence. The case leaves open the question of how rapid the progress
must be.75 What Jackson requires in practice, however, simply may be
mandatory periodic re-evaluation of the condition of inmates held on
this basis to insure that continued confinement is justified by progress
76
toward competence.
The competency proceedings set out in R.C.W. ch. 10.77 are consistent with the commands of Jackson. The statute provides for periodic review of commitment orders and sets 12 / months as the maximum time that an incompetent person may be confined without invoking the civil commitment procedures of R.C.W. ch. 71.05.77 In no
75. Justice Blackmun observed: "In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to
attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits." 406 U.S. at 738.
It seems reasonable to require that the defendant's competency be restored by the
time he would have been eligible for parole if he had been convicted and sentenced
for the original crime charged. Detention after that point should be based upon civil
commitment proceedings. The use of the time of eligibility for parole rather than
the time of maximum sentence as the cut-off date for this form of commitment is
not without precedent. In United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 847 (1969), the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit looked to the length of time the petitioner had been confined beyond
the point at which he would have been eligible for parole in measuring the hardship
placed upon him by commitment.
76. In nearly every case criminal defendants are afforded the privilege of periodic
review of their cases and their progress with a view to parole, work release, or other
similar programs. See generally G. GIARDINI, THE PAROLE PROCESS 12-16 (1959).
See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-03 (1970) (parole provisions). This is precisely the sort
of procedure Jackson suggests must be utilized in the competency area.
77. The procedure commences when it appears to the court that there is reason to
doubt a defendant's competency. When such a doubt is present, the court commits
the defendant to a hospital or other facility for the purpose of evaluating his mental
condition. This initial commitment cannot exceed 15 days. WASH. REV. CODE §
10.77.060(1) (1974). If the evaluation indicates that the defendant is incompetent,
the court may commit the defendant for an additional 90 days. This commitment is
reviewed at a hearing before the 90 days expire. Id. § 10.77.090(1). If at this hearing
the court finds the defendant incompetent, it may order a second 90-day commitment.
This second commitment is reviewed at a hearing and either the judge or a jury makes
a finding as to competence. Id. § 10.77.090(2). If the defendant is still incompetent,
civil commitment proceedings must be commenced to further detain the defendant
unless the trier of fact determines that the defendant is dangerous and that there is a
substantial possibility that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable
time. If these latter findings are made, the period of commitment may be extended for
an additional six months. At the end of this six-month period (121/2 months of total confinement), no further extensions are allowed without commencement of civil commitment proceedings. Id. § 10.77.090(3).
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event can the period of commitment exceed the maximum possible
penal sentence for the offense charged. 78 Thus Washington compe79
tency proceedings conform with the principle of equivalence.
Because of the similarities between competency hearings and criminal trials the extension of those due process rights which are presently
afforded criminal defendants to the accused in competency hearings
is reasonable. There appears to be no practical or doctrinal barrier to
conducting the competency hearing in the same manner as a criminal
trial. Indeed, such a requirement would fill the large void in Supreme
Court opinions as to the nature of this hearing. The Jackson Court
recognized that competency hearings are at least of the same genus as
civil commitment. It severely limited the right of the state to detain individuals for prolonged periods without utilizing the processes that
would be used if the individual were involved in a civil commitment
proceeding or an actual criminal trial. Confinement because of incompetence to stand trial is not a specialized form of confinement in which
meager due process protections are acceptable, but rather it is a process
designed to make the defendant competent to stand trial and to which
the ordinary forms of due process apply.
B.

Commitment Following a Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity

1.

Insanity determination

The initial verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal
trial raises few due process problems. A finding of insanity under any
of the several American tests 80 is sufficient to justify some added state

78.

Id. § 10.77.020(3).

79. With respect to the rights to hearing, counsel, and jury trial, there is almost
complete equivalence between the civil commitment procedures of WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 71.05 (1974) and the competency procedures of id. ch. 10.77. The major distinction between the two procedures is with respect to the burden of proof required.
Under id. ch. 71.05. the state can force commitment of an individual only by proving
its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text
supra. On the other hand, under id. ch. 10.77. the state can force commitment if it
establishes incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
80. See Morris. Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1968); Comment. The
AL! Model Penal Code Insanity Test, 44 TULANE L. REV. 192 (1969). See also Eyman
v. Alford. 448 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1969). American jurisdictions follow three basic
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scrutiny of the person adjudged criminally insane. In the federal
courts, the defendant is presumed sane until "some evidence" is introduced to the contrary, which necessitates a jury instruction on the
issue of insanity. 81 The burden is upon the government to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was sane at the time
the crime was committed. 82 In Washington, the burden is upon the
83
defendant to show insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
2.

Commitment procedures

When one has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, the difficult decision to commit or release the defendant must be made.
Commitment at this stage is justified by one of the two traditional
bases for deprivation of liberty, viz., protection of society or treatment of the patient.8 4 Some jurisdictions allow commitment only upon
85
a showing of present dangerousness.

tests for establishing insanity: (1) the M'Naghten test; (2) the Durham rule; or (3)
the Model Penal Code test.
Under the M'Naghten test, a defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if.
at the time of the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, created by a
disease of the mind, that he did not know the nature and quality of his act, i.e., he did
not know that his act was wrong. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 274 (1972). Under the Durham rule, developed by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
a defendant is not criminally responsible for an act if that act was the "product" of a
mental disease or defect. LAFAVE & ScoTT at 286. Under the Model Penal Code insanity test, a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, as a result of mental
disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Washington follows the M'Naghten test of insanity. See, e.g., State v. Ferrick, 81
Wn. 2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973); State v. Reece, 79 Wn. 2d 453, 486 P.2d 1088
(1971); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wn. 2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968); State v. Henke.
196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938). The M'Naghten "right-wrong" test is incorporated in the revised Washington Criminal Code. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.12.010 (Supp.
1975) (effective July 1, 1976).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 473 F.2d 461 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Hedges, 458 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1972); Wilson v.
United States, 288 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Battle v. United States, 209
U.S. 36 (1908) (until evidence is produced by defendant, government's burden of
proof satisfied by the presumption arising from the fact that most persons are sane).
82. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1951); United States v. Tesfa, 404 F.
Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.030(2) (1974).
84. See note 7 supra.
85. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 8 Ore. App. 263, 493 P.2d 1386 (1972) (defendant
acquitted of crime by reason of insanity cannot be committed merely because her
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The fundamental legal issue in this area is whether commitment to

a mental institution may follow immediately upon an acquittal on
grounds of insanity or whether the state must make some additional
showing of the defendant's present dangerous condition beyond the

defendant's conviction of a criminal act. Several state courts have held
that mandatory commitment following acquittal on the grounds of
insanity does not deny due process. 8 6 The rationale for these cases is
that the finding of insanity at the time of the crime creates a presump-

tion of continuing insanity, 8 7 obviating the need for a separate precommitment hearing on the issue of insanity. This presumption makes
the commitment decision a dispositional one comparable to the sentencing of a convicted criminal defendant where a statute allows the
court no discretion as to the sentence.
The United States Supreme Court apparently finds mandatory
commitments to be constitutionally suspect, although it has never
squarely faced the issue. In Lynch v. Overholser,88 the mandatory
commitment provision of the District of Columbia Code 89 was challenged as denying due process of law by failing to provide for an in-

mental condition was such that institutionalization was desirable). Likewise. Washington requires a showing of present dangerousness in this situation. See notes 95-96
and accompanying text infra. For a comprehensive review of the state statutes governing this topic see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION. supra note 10. at 404-05. 430-43. See

also Note. Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal
Protection ofthe Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 924. 924-25 (1968).
86. Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969); Chase v. Kearns. 278 A.2d 132
(Me. 1971); People v. Dubina. 304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99. cert. denied, 319 U.S.
766 (1943); Newton v. Brooks. 246 Ore. 484. 426 P.2d 446 (1967); Schopf v. Schubert. 45 Wis. 2d 644. 173 N.W.2d 673 (1970). See generally Note. The Rights of the
Person Acquitted by Reason of Insanity: Equal Protection and Due Process, 24 ME.
L. REV. 135 (1972).
Mandatory commitment is prescribed by statute in a number of states. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1963); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966(12) (1972); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.19 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(1) (1975); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-508(a) (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.521 (1975); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
957.11(3) (1958).
87. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1972). This presumption may well be unrealistic given the time factor between the
commission of a crime and trial. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION. supra note 10. at

404 n.290.
88. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
89. D.C. CODE ANN. 24-301(d)(1) (1973) provides in part:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises
the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane
at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release ....
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quiry into present sanity. The Court avoided that question by interpreting the statute as requiring mandatory commitment only where
the defendant had affirmatively pleaded insanity and held that Lynch
(who had not affirmatively pleaded the defense) could not be committed without being afforded the same procedural protections afforded those facing involuntary civil commitment.9 0
In the aftermath of Lynch, some courts have found mandatory
commitment procedures unacceptable. In Bolton v. Harris,9 1 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the District of Columbia Code's mandatory commitment procedure to be
"constitutionally suspect." 92 Accordingly, the court mandated that a
hearing establishing present insanity, i.e., at the date of the judgment
of acquittal, must be held before the acquitted person can be committed. 93 Recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that state's

90. The reasoning in Lynch suggests that mandatory commitment may be unconstitutional in those jurisdictions which, like the District of Columbia, require
proof of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In such jurisdictions "some evidence" of
insanity is sufficient for acquittal on the basis of the inculpating defense. See note 81
and accompanying text supra. A greater quantum of evidence, however, than "some"
evidence of insanity should be required prior to an indefinite commitment to a mental
hospital.
The same argument can be made with regard to jurisdictions requiring mandatory
commitment, but placing the burden upon the defendant to prove his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence. Of those states with mandatory commitment statutes,
see note 86 supra, the following also require the defendant to establish insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence: Georgia, see Ross v. State, 217 Ga. 569, 124 S.E.2d
280 (1962); Maine, see State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963); Minnesota,
see State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960); Missouri, see State v.
Holmes, 439 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1969); Montana, see State v. DeHaan, 88 Mont. 407,
292 P. 1109 (1930); Nevada, see Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 47"5 P.2d 671 (1970);
Ohio, see State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 (1964); Virginia, see
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 157 S.E.2d 185 (1967). Although in these
jurisdictions more evidence of insanity must be introduced to gain acquittal, a determination of present insanity is still not required as it would be in a civil commitment proceeding.
91. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
92. Id. at 650. The court relied upon the case of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966), for the proposition that the element of present dangerousness, a prerequisite to civil commitment under the D.C. Code, could not be presumed from the
mere fact of prior criminal activity. The court went on to require substantial equivalence between the civil and criminal commitment procedures. The court also found
support for its position in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht, the
Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal defendant facing commitment based
upon the "distinct issue" of his being determined to be a sexual psychopath was entitled to a full hearing on that issue. The Bolton court interpreted Specht to require
a hearing on the "distinct issue of the accused's present insanity." 395 F.2d at 650.
93. The court specifically held that "persons found not guilty by reason of insanity
must be given a judicial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil
commitment proceedings." Id. at 651.
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mandatory commitment procedures to be violative of the equal pro94
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Washington law does not allow mandatory commitment after acquittal on grounds of insanity. Instead, whenever the issue of insanity
is taken to the jury, the court is required to instruct the jury to return
a special verdict which includes a finding as to the defendant's present
dangerousness. 95 If the defendant is not found to be presently dangerous, the court must discharge him from custody. 9 6 Because an acquitted person can be committed only upon a jury determination of
present dangerousness, there is substantial equivalence between civil
97
and criminal commitment in this aspect of Washington law.
3.

Nature and duration of the confinement

The Court in Jackson implied that one committed as incompetent
to stand trial must receive treatment aimed at making him competent,
but the nature of confinement required under a not guilty by reason of
insanity verdict is as yet undefined. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Ashe v. Robinson9" held that treatment by
means of the least restrictive alternative 99 was required by the terms of
94. State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612. 219 N.W.2d 341 (1974).
appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 419 U.S. 1117. cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1130 (1975). See also People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27. 224 N.E.2d 87. 277
N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.040 (1974).
96. Id. § 10.77.110 provides in part:
If a defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, and it is found that he is not a
substantial danger to other persons. or does not present a substantial likelihood
of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept
under further control by the court or other persons or institutions, the court shall
direct his final discharge.
97. There may. however, be a disparity in burdens of proof. Whereas the state
must prove dangerousness "by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" in a civil commitment proceeding. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.310. it is unclear what burden of
proof is required to establish the present dangerousness of one acquitted on grounds
of insanity. Id. § 10.77.040 (providing for a special finding of dangerousness after an
insanity acquittal) is silent on the burden issue. Justice Hamilton. in Alter v. Morris.
85 Wn. 2d 414, 418. 536 P.2d 630. 632 (1975). recognized this ambiguity but did not
resolve it: "The burden of proof on the issue of commitment at the time of acquittal
is unclear from the statute." If in practice the state need only establish present dangerousness by a preponderance of evidence, there is a significant disparity between civil
and criminal commitment standards. A similar problem of nonequivalent standards
exists with respect to release procedures. See notes 139-48 and accompanying text
infra.
98. 450 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99. The District of Columbia Circuit had previously recognized the least restrictive alternative doctrine in Lake v. Cameron. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and
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the statute' 0 0 applicable to not guilty by reason of insanity commit-

ments in the District of Columbia. Washington's statutory framework
is similar to that of the District of Columbia in mandating "adequate
care and individualized treatment"'10 1 and "appropriate alternative
102
treatment less restrictive than detention in a state mental hospital."'
Consistent with the provisions of R.C.W. ch. 71.05 limiting the duration of civil commitment confinement, 03 Section 10.77.020(3) provides that the period of criminal commitment cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for the offense originally charged. Thus
Washington procedures are again substantially consistent with the
principle of equivalence.
C.

Commitment of Convicted Criminal Defendants in Lieu of
Sentencing to a PenalInstitution

The commitment of a convicted defendant in lieu of sentencing
to a penal institution is governed by one of two types of statutes.
Sexual psychopath acts, the first type of legislation, allow for the
commitment of those found to be not insane but nonetheless dan-

gerous to society because of an inability to control sexual impulses. 04

Defective delinquency statutes, the second type of legislation, are inin Covington v. Harris; 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The least restrictive alternative doctrine finds support in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), wherein the
United States Supreme Court remarked:
[E] yen though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.
Id. at 488 (footnote omitted). For a general discussion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine see Developments, supra note 7, at 1245.
100. D.C. CODE ANN. 21-545(b) (1973) provides in part:
If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty,
the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order
any other alternative course of treatment which the court believes will be in
the best interests of the person or of the public.
101.

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.210 (1974).

102. Id. § 10.77.110 (1974). See also id. § 10.77.040 which requires the jury to
make a special finding whether the defendant should be placed in treatment that is less
restrictive than detention in a mental hospital.
103. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
104. Twenty-eight states have enacted special legislation dealing with sexual psychopaths. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 362-75. See also Millard v.
Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Petition of Peterson, 354 Mass. 116, 236
N.E.2d 82 (1968); People v. Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d
943 (1968).
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tended to provide for the commitment of persons who demonstrate a
propensity toward criminal behavior coupled with an emotional imbalance or intellectual deficiency sufficient to render them dangerous
to society. 10 5 Washington's Sexual Psychopath and Psychopathic Delinquent Act is found at R.C.W. ch. 71.06.106
Although it has been claimed that these sexual psychopath and
defective delinquency statutes are civil in nature 0 7 and thus beyond
the reach of the procedural protections required by the Constitution in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court has refused to accept such a view
and has chosen to look to the substance rather than the form of such
acts. In Specht v. Patterson'0 8 the provisions of Colorado's sexual
psychopath statute were challenged. The state scheme provided that
upon a finding that a defendant convicted under some other criminal
statute was a sexual psychopath, such defendant could be sentenced,
without notice or hearing, to indeterminate confinement in a mental
institution. The state argued that this was a mere sentencing alternative within the discretion of the trial judge under Williams v. New
York.' 0 9 The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that
"commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are
subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and to the Due Process Clause."' 10 The Court analogized
the statute to the "distinct issue" involved in the determination that

105. The operation of defective delinquency statutes is generally quite similar to
that of sexual psychopath statutes. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Supra note 10. at 342.
The operation of this type of legislation is discussed in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) and in Patuxent Inst. v. Daniels. 243 Md. 16. 221
A.2d 397 (1966). See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-244 (1960); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 31 B, § 5 (1967).
Similar in rationale to the defective delinquency statutes are the so-called recidivist
or habitual criminal statutes. Statutes of the latter type seem to assume implicitly that
repeat offenders are in some way "'abnormal." Despite this similarity, a full discussion
of habitual offender legislation is beyond the scope of the present Comment. Washington's habitual criminal statute is WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (1974).
106. WASH. REV. CODE §8 71.06.010-.260 (1974).
107. See, e.g., People v. Oliver. 32 III. App. 3d 772. 336 N.E.2d 586 (1975) (proceedings under Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are civil, not criminal); Chenault v.
Director. Patuxent Inst.. 28 Md. App. 357. 345 A.2d 440 (1975) (right to speedy
trial does not apply to defective delinquency hearings which are not criminal in nature).
108. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
109. 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (due process clause neither requires the judge to hold
a hearing nor to give convicted person the opportunity to participate in such hearing

prior to determination of sentence to be imposed).
110. 386 U.S. at 608.
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one was a habitual criminal1 11 and expressed agreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States
ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,112 holding that in such a situation a
defendant is entitled to "the full panoply of the relevant protections
113
which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings."
The Court in Specht went on to enumerate the procedural safeguards required in a hearing to determine sexual psychopathy as a distinct issue: "Due process ... requires that [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted
with the witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to
offer evidence of his own."" 4 This enumeration of rights did not include the right to a jury determination of the factual issues or the right
to have the state meet a particular burden of proof. 1 5 Some state
courts have taken the view that only those rights specifically enumerated by the Court in Specht apply to sexual psychopath proceedings." 6 This view was recently rejected by the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin.117
The Supreme Court further clarified the procedural rights of persons committed under sexual offender statutes in Humphrey v.
Cady.1 8 In Humphrey the Court remanded for further consideration
IlI.

Id. at 610. The Court cited Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) for this

proposition. Oyler established the principle that a defendant must receive reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard when faced with an habitual criminal charge.
1.12.

355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966) (defendant is entitled to full judicial hearing

before imposition of an increased sentence under Pennsylvania's sex offender statute).
113. Id.at312.
114.

386 U.S. at 610. See also Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1973).

115. It can be argued that a jury trial is required and that the proper burden is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the Court's quotation from and explicit
agreement with the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United
States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). 386 U.S. at 60910. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has taken this
position. Note, Rights of the Person Acquitted by Reason of Insanity: Equal Protection and Due Process, 24 MAINE L. REv. 135, 146 (1967).
f16. See e.g., People v. Oliver, 32 Ill. App. 772, 336 N.E.2d 586 (1975) (burden

of proof is by preponderance of the evidence); State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166
N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1969); Commonwealth v. Pifer, 440 Pa. 172, 269 A.2d 909
(1970).
117. 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975) (due process requires that the reasonable
doubt standard be applied in proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act). See also In re Andrews, 334 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. 1975) (sexual dangerousness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Jetter, 15 Cal. 3d 407,
540 P.2d 1217, 124 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1975) (same); Syvock v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 411,
213 N.W.2d 11 (1973) (burden on state to satisfy trier of fact to a reasonable certainty by the great weight of credible evidence).
118. 405 U.S. 504(1972).
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an appeal challenging various aspects of Wisconsin's sexual deviant
statute. The petitioner, Donald Humphrey, was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and sentenced to a one year jail
term. On the basis of a finding that under the applicable Wisconsin
statute, his act was "probably directly motivated by a desire for sexual
excitement,"' 19 Humphrey was referred to the Department of Health
and Social Services for examination. The Department recommended
specialized treatment and, under the applicable statutory scheme,
Humphrey was committed for treatment for the duration of his sentence. The statute also provided that upon a finding of dangerousness
the defendant could be subject to renewal orders, each of five years
duration. Thus confinement under the act could have been for an indefinite period without submission of the dangerousness issue to a jury
even though Wisconsin provided a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings.
Humphrey brought a habeas corpus action contending that the renewal orders were essentially the same as civil commitment and that
the equal protection clause required a jury determination of the relevant issues. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to
hear the petition. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing Specht and
Baxstrom v. Herold 2 0° as supporting the petitioner's claim. The Court
indicated that the petitioner's right to a jury trial at the initial confinement hearing was not being considered, but only his right to a jury
12 1
trial at the time of a renewal order.
119. Under WIs. STAl. ANN. § 975.02 (1975). after the defendant has been convicted of a crime, the court may then consider whether the crime was "'probably directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement."
120. 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (violation of equal protection to continue the confinement of a convict in an institution for the criminally insane after the expiration of
his sentence without a civil commitment proceeding).
121. 405 U.S. at 511 n.7. Humphrey is enlightening in that it seems to make clear
the Court's view of the application of Specht. The Specht decision appears to apply
to the initial commitment proceedings where the determinative fact is whether the
defendant was 'probably motivated by a desire for sexual excitement."" In such a situation, the Court seems to indicate that only those procedural rights enumerated in
Specht are required. But where the state's right to commit is asserted on a basis which
is essentially the same as that provided for in civil commitment, and the potential
period of confinement is for a longer term than the sentence imposed, equal protection
requires that the procedural safeguards utilized in both cases be the same.
The doctrinal logic of this differing treatment is at least questionable. The view implied by the Court in Humphrey seems to be that there is some possibility of a special
characteristic of sexual deviance, as opposed to other forms of mental illness, which
justifies the use of lesser procedures. Yet, it is clear that the equal protection clause
would not allow different procedural protections for one committed as suffering
from a manic-depressive psychosis than for one committed on the basis of simple
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In 1971 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,122 a case involving a comprehensive challenge to Maryland's defective delinquency laws. The statute had been
upheld below on the grounds that the statute was civil in nature and
that the procedural protections provided were therefore adequate to
satisfy due process. 123 The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted as to all of the defendants but one because Maryland
was engaged in a substantial revision of its commitment laws and even
if the petitioners succeeded they would not (with a single exception)
124
be released from custody.
In McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution125 the Court resolved
the issues raised by the appeal of the lone remaining Maryland petitioner. McNeil had been convicted in 1966 and sentenced to five years
imprisonment. The sentencing report, however, referred him to Patuxent Institution for a psychiatric examination to determine whether
he should be sent to prison or indefinitely committed as a defective
delinquent. McNeil refused to cooperate with the state's psychiatrists
and asserted the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination 12 6 whenever an attempt was made to examine him.
Thus the sole basis for his six year confinement was an ex parte order.
The Court, citing Jackson v. Indiana,'27 held that it was a denial of
due process to continue to hold the petitioner on the basis of an ex
neuroses. Because the avowed purpose of the confinement under either a sexual deviant
statute or a civil commitment scheme is invariably to protect society from the defendant's dangerous propensities and to provide treatment and because diagnostic categories such as "sexual deviant" and "neurotic" are by no means absolute, the distinc-

tion implied in Humphrey appears untenable. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl,
On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PENN. L. REv. 75, 80 (1968).
122. 404U.S. 999 (1971).
123. Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Tippett

v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971).
124. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972). The petitioners would not have been released because they were subject to criminal sentences that
had not yet expired. In a vigorous dissent to the dismissal of the writ, Justice Douglas
challenged the adequacy of using the fair preponderance of the evidence test as the

burden of proof for commitment under such a statute:
Speiser [Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)] and Winship [In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)] indicate that an individual's personal liberty is an interest of transcending value for the deprivation of which the State must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. I would follow established precedent and hold

that a State may not subject individuals to lengthy-if not indefinite--incarceration
under a lesser burden of proof.
Id. at 365.
125.

407 U.S. 245 (1972).

126. With respect to the self-incrimination issue see note 63 and accompanying
text supra.
127. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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parte order committing him without the procedural safeguards required for long-term commitment and, observing that his confinement
had outlasted the duration of his potential criminal sentence, ordered
his release.' 28 Thus, in the area of sexual deviance and defective delinquency laws, the Supreme Court has come close to adopting the principle of equivalence and has applied criminal due process rights to at
least a portion of the criminal commitment field.
Consistent with Specht, Humphrey, and McNeil, the Washington
statutory scheme provides procedural safeguards for persons subject
to sexual psychopath and psychopathic delinquent proceedings. The
statute specifically provides for a hearing on the issue of psychopathy12 9 and for the right to a jury trial. 130 In addition, R.C.W. §
71.06.080 provides, inter alia, that "[n]othing in this chapter [relating to sexual psychopaths and psychopathic delinquents] shall be
construed as to affect the procedure for the ordinary conduct of crim13 1
inal trials as otherwise set up by law."
D.

Release Following Criminal Commitment-The Need for
Equivalence

The barriers to obtaining release after criminal commitment are
considerable. Often an individual's right to release depends upon
whether the inmate involved is no longer dangerous. Unlike the commitment procedure where the burden is generally upon the state to
128. The majority opinion adds little to what had already been held in Jackson,
but simply applies that case to a new set of facts. McNeil at least indicates that the
Jackson decision will not be narrowly construed.
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.040 (1974) (sexual psychopaths); id. § 71.06.210
(psychopathic delinquents). See also State ex rel. Schillberg v. Morris. 85 Wn. 2d
382, 536 P.2d 1 (1975) (state must complete prosecution for underlying sex crime
before commencement of hearing on sexual psychopathy). But cf. State v. Osborn.
87 Wn. 2d 161, 550 P.2d 513 (1976) (sole discretion as to filing of petition for sexual
psychopathy proceeding vested in prosecuting attorney).
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.070 (1974) (sexual psychopaths); id. § 71.06.230
(psychopathic delinquents).
131. Arguably, this provision means that sexual psychopathy must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Washington court, however, has not ruled on this
particular point. The statute also leaves unclear the maximum length of confinement
possible under a psychopathy commitment. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020 (3)
(1974) (limiting the period of confinement for the criminally insane to the maximum
possible penal sentence for the offense charged). But see McCubbin v. Director.
Patuxent Inst., 17 Md. App. 351, 302 A.2d 712 (1973) (indeterminate sentences beyond term of originally imposable sentence for purposes of treatment under defective
delinquent act are proper).
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establish dangerousness, release procedures often demand that the
132
defendant carry the burden of showing a lack of dangerousness.
1.

Disparity in release standards "

Court decisions in several states have held that procedural and substantive burdens placed upon one seeking release after a criminal
commitment can be greater than those imposed upon patients seeking
release after involuntary civil commitment. 133 It is argued that criminally committed persons fall into a special class because they have
committed criminal offenses and in some jurisdictions, including
Washington, have proven their own insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence. In Chase v. Kearns, the Maine court expressed this no13 4
tion in the following fashion:
The special interest which the public has acquired in the confinement
and release of people in this exceptional class results from the fact that
there has been a judicial determination that they have already endangered the public safety and their own as a result of their mental conditions as distinguished from people civilly committed because of only
potential danger.
The position taken in Chase appears contrary to the view expressed
35
by Chief Justice Warren in Baxstrom v. Herold:'
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously
insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no
relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether
a person is mentally ill at all. For purposes of granting judicial review

132. Eidinoff v. Connolly, 281 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (state may lawfully condition release of its criminally insane patient upon showing of mental fitness
and lack of dangerousness). See also United States v. Ecker, 44 U.S.L.W. 2518 (D.C.
Cir. April 2, 1976); Alter v. Morris, 85 Wn. 2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975). See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 430-43.
133. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1972); Mills v. State, 256 A.2d 752 (Del. 1969); People v. Pembrock, 320 N.E.2d
470 (I11.App. 1974); State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App. 1974); Newton
v. Brooks, 246 Ore. 484, 426 P.2d 446 (1967); State ex rel. Schopf v. Schubert, 45
Wis. 2d 644, 173 N.W.2d 673 (1970).
134. 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971).
135. 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966) (emphasis in original). In Baxstrom the Court
was concerned with the power of the state to impose different standards on confinement solely because of prior criminal activity. The Court held that it could not do so.
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before a jury of the question whether a person is mentally ill and in
need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal
term from all other civil commitments.

State v. Clemons136 is the leading case applying the Baxstrom rationale to disparities between release standards in civil and criminal
commitment procedures. In Clemons, the Arizona court held unconstitutional a statutory provision placing the burden of showing lack of
present dangerousness upon the criminally committed person petitioning for his release from a mental institution. The court found the
provision contrary to the equal protection clause because persons
committed through civil proceedings were not required to bear a similar burden when they sought release from confinement.' 37 A significant number of recent decisions have also struck down, on equal protection grounds, statutory schemes which emphasize the difference
138
between civil and criminal commitment.
Washington does not recognize the principle of equivalence in this
area of law. A brief comparison of R.C.W. ch. 71.05 with ch. 10.77
illustrates the typical disparity of release standards between civil and
criminal commitment procedures in Washington. With respect to civilly committed persons, the statutes mandate periodic reevaluation
and place the burden upon the state to establish at least each 180 days
that the committed person is still dangerous.

139

The state must estab-

136. 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324(1973). noted in 20WAYNE L. REV. 1343 (1974).
137. 515 P.2d at 329. The court concluded that the state could not rationally distinguish between the civilly and the criminally committed.
138. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Neill, 381 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex. 1974); In re
Andrews. 334 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. 1975) (placing burden in release proceeding on sexually dangerous person violates equal protection when burden is on state in civil commitment release proceeding); People v. McQuillan. 392 Mich. 511. 221 N.W.2d 569
(1974) (Jackson and Baxstrom require that substantially similar release procedures
be provided to those acquitted by reason of insanity as provided to those civilly committed); State v. Krol. 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); cf. People v. Lally. 19
N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
See also Justice Rosellini's dissent in Alter v. Morris. 85 Wn. 2d 414. 536 P.2d 630
(1975) where he remarked:
I can perceive no significant difference between the criminally insane and the
civilly insane which affords a justification for placing the burden of proving recovery on the patient in the one case and on the institution in the other.
Id. at 429, 536 P.2d at 638. But see United States v. Ecker, 44 U.S.L.W. 2518 (D.C.
Cir. April 2, 1976) (Neither Baxstrom nor general equal protection principles require
that the same release standards be applied both to persons involuntarily civilly committed and persons acquitted by reason of criminal insanity).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320 (1974).
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lish its position by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence."' 140 Furthermore, the person in, charge of an institution can, on his own initiative, release a civilly committed patient before the expiration of the
commitment period when it appears that the patient "no longer pre14
sents a likelihood of serious harm to others." '
In contrast to the civil release provisions, the person committed
after acquittal on grounds of insanity will be discharged only upon a
showing by the preponderance of the evidence that he may be discharged "without substantial danger to other persons."'1 42 The burden
in the release proceeding is upon the petitioner, not the state. 143 Additionally, the director of a mental institution cannot discharge a criminally insane person "save upon the order of a court of competent jur44
isdiction made after a hearing and judgment of discharge.'
This lack of equivalence between civil and criminal release standards was challenged in Alter v. Morris. 4 5 The petitioners 14 6 argued
that the difference in release procedures denied equal protection to
insanity-acquitted inmates because of the heavier procedural burden
imposed on them. 147 The Washington court rejected this constitutional attack by distinguishing the two groups (civilly and criminally
140. Id. § 71.05.310.
141. Id. § 71.05.330.
142. Id. § 10.77.200(2) (1974). Prior to the legislature's specification of the preponderance of evidence standard in 1974, Washington decisional law had required
the criminally insane person to show that it was "highly probable" that he was a safe
person in order to be released. See State v. Blubaugh, 80 Wn. 2d 28, 491 P.2d 646
(1971); State v. Lake, 7 Wn. App. 322, 499 P.2d 219 (1972).
Generally, other jurisdictions require the criminally committed person to carry the
burden by a preponderance of the evidence at his release hearing on the question of
dangerousness. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
People v. Beksel, 10 Ill. App. 3d 406, 294 N.E.2d Ill (1973); State v. Montague,
510 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App. 1974); State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
143.

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.200(2) (1974).

144. Id. § 10.77.120. A similar provision in id. ch. 71.06 provides that the supervisor of a correctional facility "shall never release the sexual psychopath from custody
without a court release .... " Id. § 71.06.091. The superintendent of an institution
has more discretion with regard to the release of psychopathic delinquents. Id. §
71.06.240.
145. 85 Wn. 2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975).
146. Each petitioner was incarcerated in a Washington state mental hospital. Each
had been acquitted of criminal charges on grounds of insanity. Id. at 415, 536 P.2d at
631.
147. Justice Hamilton summarized the petitioners' argument:
[P] etitioners contend that equal protection requires that the difference in treatment be justified by its relation to a valid public purpose under a strict scrutiny
test. The State, they argue, must show that a compelling interest is satisfied by
subjecting the insanity acquitted to a more burdensome procedure than that confronted by the civilly committed.
Id. at 419, 536 P.2d at 633.
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committed persons) and finding them thus legitimately subject to dif148
ferent procedural burdens.
2.

Other proceduralsafeguards

R.C.W. ch. 10.77 provides the criminally committed person a right
to a hearing on the issue of release and also sanctions the use of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging confinement.1 49 The statute
also guarantees the right to a jury at the release hearing.15 0 The California Court of Appeals has specifically recognized the right to
counsel at release proceedings.1 5 1 To be consistent with the principle
of equivalence, such procedural rights as are granted those civilly
committed upon release should likewise be available to those committed on the basis of an insanity acquittal.
The release procedures for sexual deviant or defective delinquent
defendants are similar to those for persons found not guilty by reason
of insanity. It has been held that while conviction of a crime might not
justify substantially different procedures, a state legislature may require consideration of conviction in deciding whether to release a sex
deviant.152 Federal constitutional rights have not been extensively
53
elaborated in this area.'
III.

CONCLUSION

Most of the recent leading cases on commitment have embodied the
premise that criminal commitment is of the same nature and for the
same purpose as civil commitment and that the equal protection
clause therefore precludes any substantial difference in the procedures
utilized in the two situations.1 54 This approach, however, may have a
148. The court considered insanity-acquitted persons to be "an exceptional class
of persons." Id. at 421, 536 P.2d at 634.
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.200 (1974).
150. Id.
151. In re Jones, 260 Cal. App. 2d 906, 68 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1968).
152. Hill v. Burke, 289 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
153. Under Washington law, whether a sexual psychopath receives a release hearing appears to be left to the discretion of the committing court. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.06.091 (1974).
154. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold.
383 U.S. 107 (1966); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v.
Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324 (1973).
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negative impact in some states in which questionable civil standards
provide poor guidelines for desirable criminal commitment standards.
The application of the principle of equivalence to insure procedural
due process for all persons deprived of their liberty is frustrated by
the lack of a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the rights which attach to the civil commitment process. At present, however, a logical
extension of recent cases based upon the principle of equivalence
would require that all persons faced with a potential deprivation of
liberty be afforded substantially similar rights of procedural due process, without regard to the label attached to the proceedings involved.
Hopefully, a comprehensive set of procedural standards applicable to
all commitment proceedings can be developed.
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